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00:00:00

Rachel DeHart: This interview is being conducted as part of the Wright State
University project documenting the history of technology during the Cold War.
The interviewee is Mr. Victor Bilek and the interviewer is Rachel DeHart. The
date is Wednesday, November 14, 2007.
Mr. Bilek you were a participant in the development of air technical
intelligence for the Air Force during several decades of the Cold War. Will you
please provide a synopsis of your professional career beginning with your
university education? Why did you choose engineering?

00:02:14

Vic Bilek: Well I got out of high school with a pretty fair aptitude for math and
physics and so I finally thought about going to the University of Washington,
Seattle, and signed up for the mechanical engineering not really knowing too
much about it as a career. I’d had no previous contact or guidance and I found
that university work was a lot more difficult than high school and struggled
through four years and took ROTC the Whole way. So, as 1941 approached, it
became all the more apparent that we weren’t going to go out into a professional
career, we were going to go into the army and we were going to get into a war.
We all felt that way, and it turned out it was right. And so, graduation ceremonies
on Saturday, June 14, 141 and I went on active duty—I had Sunday off and went
on active duty on Monday, June 16, for a one year assignment. I quit 32 years
later.

00:03:40

DeHart: Was that first assignment to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base?

00:03:43

Bilek: No, I was—my commission was in the Coast Guard Auxiliary, Coast
Guard—[clarifying] it was in the coast artillery. I was assigned to Fort Louis,

Washington, with a mechanized anti-aircraft outfit. It was the only one of its kind
on the Pacific coast. About a month and a half down the way, got a message from
Wright Field: would I consider a job in engineering at Wright Field? This had
resulted from a recruiting swing that the Wright Field staff did at major
universities. After the recruiting approach, those that were interested were invited
to sign up if they would like to consider, and I did. And then to add to the story,
my regimental commander was an engineer. He said, “Son there is no future in
the artillery. You take that engineering year at Wright Field—it’ll do you a lot of
good.” And as I said it went on for 32 years.
00:04:54

DeHart: Did you start in intelligence

00:04:57

Bilek: No, I started in armament laboratory of the engineering division. My first
assignment was on the Norden bombsight, and when war was declared [on]
December 7, ’41, virtually the next day I was pulled out and assigned Assistant
Provo-Marshall at Wright Field to set up air defense at Wright Field because of
my anti-aircraft background, military-wise. So I was involved in that for about
ten months and then returned to the armament laboratory and worked with the
Norden bombsight instillations and several aircraft including the B-36. Then I
was transferred to fire control for the B-29 program, which had a very high
priority to get the B-29s over to China to meet the commitment that Roosevelt had
made with Chiang Kai-Shek. So I started on the first B-29 delivered out of the
Renton, [Washington], the next one delivered out of Martin-Omaha and then out
of Marietta, Georgia,; and flew the first aircraft; accepted the armament when it
was acceptable; took care of problems; had a lot of B-29 time.

00:06:36

DeHart: At the end of World War II, you worked with German Scientists who
were—came to the United States.

00:06:43

Bilek: Yeah, I finished my career as Chief of the Gun Unit in the armament
laboratory and I tested some German guns removed from the ME-262, with some
startling results. One shot almost cut the tail off of a B-24, and I met the people in
tech intelligence, and then my boss in the armament laboratory went over to
Germany on the exploitation of the German technology with a group
…[remembering] General Putt—he was then Colonel Putt. At the conclusion of
this I got out of the military, went home, thought I might work for Boeing.
Turned out all of the jobs evaporated. The job I had to come back to at the
armament laboratory as a civilian also evaporated. So I called my friend, who
was then in tech intelligence, asked him if he could do something for me. He
said, “sure, we’ve got a job for you in tech intelligence armament,” so I reported
for duty with them in September of ’47. They put me on special programs. The
first one was on the production of the V-2 missiles in the underground factory in
the Hartz Mountains, called Nordhausen. I was assigned a German scientist
[Georg Richey] who had—well, he was actually a production manager,
responsible for the production of V-2s. We put out a study which is still used to

this day on the German capability.1 They could have built 1100 V-2s a month,
and had the war gone a little differently—our capability of destroying all surface
transportation frustrated them in getting equipment to the factory—components to
complete the missile. They were actually at the point of having engineers on a
bicycle bringing in guidance equipment for the missile.
His name was Georg Richey, he was a very fine gentleman to work with. And
then we got a program to clean up all the German scientific and technical
documentation. We had some thousand boxes of it. They were large shipping
boxes weighing several hundred pounds apiece, full of documents. So we formed
teams of the tech intelligence engineers with the corresponding technology of
German scientists, like an engine-to-engine man, aerodynamicist match, and so
forth. And we did the remaining several tons of German documents and finished
up by the first of 1947. I got to know a great number of the Germans, worked
with them closely, and followed some of them in their careers after that event and
still think very highly of them.
00:10:33

DeHart: What information were you taking from those documents and how was it
processed?

00:10:39

Bilek: Well, we looked for advanced German concepts. The Germans were
ahead of us in many aspects of technologies, right from the basics of metallurgy,
fuel, especially rocket fuel, and certain aerodynamics, the flying wing and …not
much in electronics, but a little bit. I think we were well ahead of them in the
field of electronics. I think it’s worth mentioning, we uncovered a document
under a German code name. We asked the Germans if anybody recognized that
code the name. One of the Germans said yes, he recognized the name. He had
been at a meeting where that particular rocket fuel had been—was discussed. We
said, “well can you tell us a little bit about it?” He said, “well, not an awful lot.”
He said “that was out of my field.” “But,” he said, “I’ll do the best I can.” So he
took a piece of paper and filled the whole paper with balanced chemical
equations, including released energy and everything, and he handed it to us and
said, “that’s all I remember.” Well I’ll challenge any American engineer to do as
good a job using all the reference material right in front of him. I thought that was
an extraordinary experience.

00:12:16

DeHart: That’s very interesting. So you began your work in intelligence with
German technology. At what point did your efforts begin to focus on Soviet
technology.

00:12:29

Bilek: Well, right at the time, at the closure of going through those German
documents, we got a message from the Pentagon to address any information we
could find of German technical, air technical intelligence on Soviet equipment.
Up to then, you know, we were looking at the Soviets as our allies. We were not
too concerned about what their military capabilities might be. But it was obvious
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that in this December, 1946, the feeling that the Soviets were going to become an
adversary was prevalent in the Pentagon, and we started looking for German
intelligence on the Russians. And we did find it right away. A very helpful base
to start the modern technical intelligence program on Soviet capabilities.
00:13:41

DeHart: So you began with German sources for information. As time progressed
how did the sources—

00:13:48

Bilek: Well then we went to all sources of intelligence. That’s a very inclusive
term of documentation: classified and open literature. We of course looked for
British intelligence on the Soviets, which they were very cooperative. I actually
went over to London and worked with the RAF [Royal Air Force] in cooperation
to get information. They were a little ahead of us at that time. We also started
programs of looking at photography taken at, for instance, the May celebration in
Moscow, when over flights of Soviet aircraft were carefully photographed by our
people, and we could see design features, enough so that we could make estimates
on their performance and military missions.

00:14:57

At this time were you performing tests on physical equipment?

00:15:03

Bilek: Yes, we had some Soviet equipment that came out of Germany, and we
were. In my field of armament, I had a collection of aircraft guns and I tested
them on the range for performance and completed a study on each gun so that we
had a real good understanding of what the Soviet guns were as compared to our
own. Theirs were quite different. They placed greater emphasis on heavier
ammunitions than we did. As you probably remember, out of the Korean War the
cannons—two 23-millimeter cannons—and one 37-millimeter cannon, and they
were found to be very lethal against our fighters and bombers. Our B-29s over
Korea took a real beating from MiG-15s.

00:16:25

DeHart: In one of our earlier conversations you talked about the testing that you
had to do on the Soviet weapons to simulate the conditions that they were being
used in the Soviet Union, with like 50-degrees-below-freezing temperatures.2

00:16:48

Bilek: Oh yes, you are referring to the cold test. We knew the Soviets had a
better understanding and capability in cold environments because of their
experience in Siberia. When we delivered our P-39s to the Soviets in Alaska we
had a terrible time with heaters to try to keep the airplanes warm enough so we
could start them up. The Soviets, upon receiving the aircraft, promptly just
drained the coolant and took it into the bunkhouse barracks and then in the
morning they took it out and poured it in in the airplanes, started it up and with no
ado, took off and went to Siberia. Well, when we got their guns we put them in
cold chambers and took them down to 40-below-zero, and sprayed them with
water and cased them in a big block of ice, and then on attempting to fire them

2
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and found that they fired real well. They were very cold weather adapted
weaponry, weapon designs.
00:18:09

DeHart: Were you making predictions about Soviet capabilities and then testing
those, or were you acquiring information and making projections about future
Soviet weapons? What was the process?

00:18:27

Bilek: Well, we combined what you’re saying, using all the intelligence that we
could get from what we called “all sources” –photography, various electronic and
photo-intercepts. We were able to see where they were and see what their trend
was and their likelihood of achieving things. A small example would be the
…when the MiG-15 was developed, the Soviets had the parallel development of
the Yak-23. The MiG-15 had the swept-wing design, which was a radical
departure at that time and strongly influenced by German engineers that the
Soviets acquired. And the Soviets were really kind of worried about the outcome
of the swept-wing fighters, so they developed this straight-wing Yak-23 as a
parallel development to ensure that they would have a jet fighter operational.
Well, as it turned out, the MiG-15, I think, was better than they expected. We
took great pride that our estimated maximum performance of the MiG-15 based
on photography and all other information that we were able to acquire on the
airplane was right on the button. When we got the MiG that was flown out of
Siberia and delivered to U.S. forces in Japan by Pilot No Kum-Sok, he did not
take it out for the 100,000 dollar reward that we had posted if anybody would
defect with the MiG-15; he didn’t know anything about it. He just flew in
because he was tired of Soviet-Communist Philosophy and wanted out. So he just
took the airplane and left. Well, we took it to Okinawa and ran extensive tests on
it and then brought it back to the United States and –further testing. And as I said
we found that our estimates of the MiG-15 performance agreed exactly with what
we found in the tests. We were very pleased with that and we presented our
method of estimating to leading engineers in American aerospace industry, and
they were all impressed with our methods and they were impressed with how
accurate we were on the MiG-15.

00:21:24

DeHart: Ok, you mentioned earlier the Yak-23 was developed, and I know that
you were involved in a project to bring a Yak-23 to Wright-Patterson to test.

00:21:36

Bilek: Not in bringing it to Wright-Patterson. I just worked on it when it got to
Wright-Patterson. It was acquired by an operation that is still secret to this day.
They will not reveal the country from which the airplane came. The people there
made arrangements through the CIA that we could have the airplane for about ten
days. It was in the boxes. Then we put it together and ran several flight tests over
Wright Field; thoroughly evaluated the airplane. The test pilot was Tom Collins,
retired Major General now, and he had been the test pilot, one of the test pilots
along with Chuck Yeager, on the MiG-15 in Okinawa. So his knowledge of
testing Soviet aircraft was very, very handy in testing the Yak in such a short time

period. And again, we found a number of valuable benchmarks on the Yak-23 of
Soviet technology and it was a very worthwhile test.
A little side not on it: during the testing, it was a very secret project and nobody
on the base other than a few knew that it was being tested. Flights were down at
the end of the runway, towards, I think it’s [State Route] 235 across the end of
that runway there. One morning some of the F-86s that were operational at
Wright-Patt at that time taxied out for morning takeoff, and they saw Collins in
this airplane. And so right away they asked Collins, what airplane was it, what
did he have at Wright Field? And he said it was an X-number, I don’t remember;
it might have been the X-5 that was being tested out at Edwards [Air Force Base]
and it had been brought to Wright Field to be tested. And these F-86 guys bought
that story without a question. And the only person that I know of that recognized
it was a 12 year old boy in Fairborn. He called the base and asked “what’s that
Soviet aircraft doing over Wright Field?”
00:24:36

DeHart: [laughing] So what specifically was your part in that project? What was
your—

00:24:41

Bilek: Well, testing the guns and gunsights. As I remember that was it. There
wasn’t anything more that we—Oh—and the armor, the armor plate.

00:24:54

DeHart: Ok. So these experiences validated the testing procedures that you were
using.

00:25:00

Bilek: Very much so.

00:25:01

DeHart: Were they all refined after that? Or was the process—

00:25:06

Bilek: Well after that, the fact is, let’s see, that was in, oh goodness, I should
know right off; it was 1953 possibly.3 We didn’t get any Soviet jet-fighters that I
can recollect until after I retired in ’73. And then we acquired several Soviet firstline jet-fighters and advanced our technology. I believe the first of those actually
came out in ’73 and was again delivered to Japan. So we were then in a later
generation of Soviet fighters, far more complex electronic systems. Of course,
they were into air-to-air missiles at that time. Very, very high performance jetfighters. I was not involved. I was retired.

00:26:19

DeHart: Ok. Can you expand a little bit upon how technical analysis—you’ve
mentioned it here---changed over the course of the Cold War as a result of the
technology developments between the early 1950s to when you retired in 1973?

00:26:40

Bilek: Well, the bigh thing was the United States’ collection activities. We
started out with virtually collecting…interrogating people, looking at open
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literature, very little classified literature, photography, and ten over the, well,
nearly fifty years of tech intelligence that I’m sort of acquainted with, the
technology has increased by leaps and bounds into a number of electronic means
of intercepting signal information. In my day, we were all sworn to more than
top-secret, virtually on our life that we would never divulge anything that we ever
knew or encountered in this area. In recent years, I’ve been amazed at how much
of this is being shown openly, like on the History Channel on TV and of course in
aviation magazines. To some extent, this tells me it’s all been declassified and
you can talk about it, but I’m still too uncomfortable because I did take an oath
that I would never divulge my experience with these particular intelligence
collection efforts. So I’d rather not go into any detail about what I know that they
are doing today. There were efforts underway in my time, say, by the United
States Navy that they did not even share rather generously with colleagues in the
Air Force. I know of one program that, like in our organization of about 1,000
people, only two people knew of it, and today it’s being openly shown on TV, of
what the Navy submarine intercept of Soviet cable transmissions from one place
to another. Ok?
00:29:32

DeHart: Ok, we will take a short break now.

[Break]
00:29:32

DeHart: This is Rachel DeHart interviewing Victor Bilek, who spent many years
working in air technical intelligence. Mr. Bilek, how was intelligence information
shared among the joint forces of the United States military and with the CIA?

00:29:49

Bilek: Well, we were of course were under general policy of sharing. There’s no
question about that. But there was a lot of jealousy about who was best and who
should be doing the primary job, and have the primary word on the findings, as
opposed to those that might be more in a support role, or one where they were at
least using the intelligence. We worked with the Navy air tech intelligence group
and the Army. In the case of the Army, we actually had an Army civilian position
in our organization and they kept that manned all the time, and he worked real
closely with our people and we shared with him. I don’t know of anybody ever
withholding information from him, and helped the Army. CIA—we knew CIA
wasn’t telling us everything they knew. They came up with some estimates that
did not exactly agree with ours. And I know at least in a few instances where it t
turned out that they were using intelligence information that we did not have and
they did not share with us. In those days it was a—there were so many categories
of special intelligence collection; you had to have special access to get to it. For
instance, we—at one point we had a number of our people go up to the
Washington area and actually work in an establishment outside of the Pentagon,
just to get at this kind of information. Later on, that was approved for our facility
and we built a special vault in our building, and the information went into that
vault, and only those of us in the organization that were cleared for it could go in
and see it and use it. It was very difficult to separate your knowledge that you

would get in this compartmentalized information, not only that, in that particular
vault but in others, from that which you were getting from more open sources.
And you had to be very careful that whatever you estimated was reasonably based
on the open information and did not reveal what you knew from other sources. I
hope I made that plain enough for you.
00:33:08

DeHart: Was that—

00:33:09

Bilek: It was pretty complex.

00:33:10

DeHart: Was that because your work was published? Or was shared—

00:33:15

Bilek: Oh! We published everything we did and had a very broad dissemination:
the whole intelligence community; research and development community; to the
operators; the military forces, domestic and overseas. WE wer one of the biggest
publishing organizations on Wright-Pat. Our studies literally went to thousands, I
think it is fairly [safe to] say.

00:33:48

DeHart: So what were you able to use the classified information for?

00:33:52

Bilek: Well, because of the sources, most of our stuff was at least secret level.
When I say “to protect a source,” this was either a human source that we had, that
if we would reveal who he was and how we got the information from him, it
literally jeopardized his life. So it was paramount that we would not reveal
anything about him. Then the INTS that we were using electronically, a lot of
that was done under cover. We were quite confident that the Soviets did not
know what we were doing; what we were getting and how valuable it was to us.
Otherwise, if they knew it, they would take measures to deny it. SO it was best
for us that they did not know what we were acquiring. For instance, just one thing
that’s well publicized—we were operating radars in northern Turkey, watching
the missiles going from Kapustin Yar to the eastern range off [the] Siberian coast.
And we tracked the missiles with radar; learned a lot about them.

00:35:23

DeHart: And that was something you could not let the Soviets know.

00:35:25

Bilek: No, in the beginning that was very classified.

00:35:27

DeHart: How did you ensure the security of the information that you were
working with? What measures were taken, beyond restricting names in
publications? How did you ensure that the information that you were getting was
accurate and that once you had it, it was secure?

00:36:06

Bilek: Well as I said, we—at least—I’m trying to get the point over that we
hardly ever depended on one source. We looked at all of these many different
ways we acquired information on Soviet technology, and were careful to compare
more than any—more than one source at one time for confirmation. It was too

risky to go out on a single source, unless it was an extraordinarily good one that
was a hundred percent verified. And I—for instance, the radar that I spoke of,
tracking the missiles—we considered that to be hard, clear, evidence of the
trajectories and other information that we got off of the missile shots. Some of
them were research on the Soviet part, and some of it was operational trial shots,
verification shots. So we would get different kinds of launches to look at and get
information on.
00:37:14

DeHart: In one of our previous conversations you mentioned that you would
sometimes get information from Soviet defectors, and that there were risks
involved with that because—

00:37:26

Bilek: Well we—a number of Soviets defected. Most of them were military. I
don’t just off hand remember a civilian, but I’m quite sure there was one or more.
But the military guys came over willingly. And of course they wanted asylum
and they also wanted the good way of life that they understood was available to
them in the United States. They liked our lifestyle that they, I guess, saw in the
movies and read in the press and so forth. So some of these, we felt, stretched the
information they gave us just to make an impression about how willing they were
to give us information. They were usually interrogated by CIA, air staff—well of
course when it was a navy person, it would be by the naval staff. But then the
tech intelligence organization—we would—we didn’t too often have them down
here at Wright Field. We usually saw them elsewhere. Had to be very careful on
accepting what they told us. Some of it of course was, I guess you might say,
natural bragging they had on the performance of their equipment. They felt just
as strongly that their equipment was the best in the world. So we had to sift that
out. It was a—it was a job.

00:39:37

DeHart: Was counterintelligence a function of the intelligence organizations at
Wright-Patterson? Did you disseminate information to try to deceive Soviet
analysts?

00:39:49

Bilek: Counterintelligence is a field that I think there were probably people in our
organization that worked in counterintelligence, but I was not privy to it. I know
nothing at all about what might have going on there.

00:40:05

DeHart: Ok. Were the results of your work at Wright-Patterson shared with U.S.
allies in the Cold War?

00:40:14

Bilek: Yes. As I think I mentioned earlier, I worked with the RAF at their
facilities in England. I visited with German and French intelligence when I was
in Europe. And we had an RAF officer based in our organization, just the same as
the US Army guy, as I’ve said. The RAF guy would be right in our work unit,
and he was just as much a part of the team as any one of our own officers. So we
worked real closely with them. I—my personal experience was always topside
with them. No problem.

00:41:08

DeHart: How were the priorities that you determined at Wright-Pat, based upon
your analysis of foreign technology information, communicated with upper levels
of Air Force management?

00:41:24

Bilek: Well, I’m not sure I fully understand your question, but [laughs]—one of
our prime customers was the research people. They wanted to know what the
Soviets were going to do five and ten years out. And a quick answer to that is,
“well, you guys don’t know what you are going to be doing five and ten years out;
how can we know what the Soviets are going to do, because they probably don’t
know any better than you people do.” Well they didn’t like that sort of answer. It
was a tough job. We had to reconcile that one, it had—the job had to be done.
The future estimate of long range capabilities had to be done, it would best be
done by somebody who was engaged in the present capabilities. Their chances of
predicting the future in a timely and correct fashion were better. Well, in later
years, after I retired, I heard that some of the predictions that I had made in the
armament field and that were made by aircraft and electronics people, and so
forth, turned out to be remarkably good. And that gave us a lot of pleasure, that
we had done a good job.

00:43:16

DeHart: Was the information that you developed, was it used to formulate or
shape broad policy, U.S. policy during the Cold War—military policy.

00:43:33

Bilek: Broad policy [laughing] I think is outside of my realm really. But such
things as what the Soviets had in the way of missiles, their achievement in space,
and antimissile, certainly had a very strong influence on broad policy in the
standoff that existed for many years in the Cold War. I’m confident that
intelligence played a very strong role, technical intelligence did, and what we—
our course of action.
We were very much involved, of course, in the Cuban affair, when it occurred and
the Soviets started delivering missiles to Cuba by ship. Also you got some of the
surface-to-air missiles in place in Cuba, and our aircraft did overhead
photography, gave us information that we provided the government to make it
positive to the Soviets that we knew what they were doing, and that we weren’t
going to stand for it. We identified things that supported the U.S. position, I’m
sure, in the U.N. and diplomatic relations.
I do remember an earlier thing in Korea. As I mentioned earlier, the Soviet MiG15 used a 37 millimeter cannon and one of the projectiles was recovered from a
B-29. [Laughing] Well, a number of them were recovered from B-29s. But one
of them in particular got into a World Court situation, where diplomats took the
Soviet support of the North Koreans into court and I in the armament business
was asked to confirm that this projectile, taken from our aircraft was not only
fired out of a Soviet-built airplane, but out of a Soviet gun. And I was able to
identify the factory where the projectile had been built, positively Soviet, and

provided that information to quote Washington for use as they will. I never did
hear what happened to it, but I had to prepare a paper as court evidence.
00:46:57

DeHart: Within the technical intelligence community, a combination of skills and
talents are necessary for success. What from your observation—which skill were
most important? Analytical skills? Management? Communication?

00:47:17

Bilek: Well my feelings of course are quite biased because I come out of the
analytic side, and I have nothing but a great deal of praise for the analysis work
being done in electronics, propulsion, rocket technology. We’ve got young
engineers, we’ve got experienced engineers, military and civilian, and put them
together as a team. They did outstanding work. As I again—early on I told you
about a meeting of top level representatives of major U.S. aerospace, and they
evaluated our methods and gave us high marks for what we were doing. And
nobody else was doing it. We felt that our work was more in depth than what was
done by the Army, Navy and CIA. Now they’ll take issue with that.

00:48:27

DeHart: How was the work environment, with a mix of military and civilian
personnel? What were the reason for the arrangement and was it effective.

00:48:40

Bilek: Well the system required the organization to be staffed by military and
civilian. The commander of course was a civilian. Chief Scientist—the
commander was a military. We had ranks from full colonel through major
generals as commanders in the years I was there. We had chief scientists as
civilian—a man of great international reputation. He had had experience in the
British aero industry before coming to the United States; very much respected.
And today we name our student aid program, scholarships, in his name. Francis
Arcieer.4
And in management level, as you went down one level, it was almost all military.
There were some breakthroughs. After I left, in particular, there were a number
of civilian top jobs in that level. But in almost every instance, the military was
backed with a civilian who was either his deputy or his technical adviser, or was
given some of her title. Nonetheless, the technical and experience level came out
of the civilians. We got a lot of military in who had never been involved in air
technical intelligence, and unfortunately, it took them a year to learn—a year on
the job—and then the next year they were figuring where they were going in their
next assignment. That didn’t work out too well. But we had a number of core
military who started with us as lieutenants and worked their way up to full
colonel. And then some of them, after their military career, went into the civilian
and went to the top grades—super grades. I’m very proud of the cooperation. A
lot of us made great friends, back and forth, that exist to this day, after we’ve been
long retired; still good friends. So it wasn’t—it was not any worse than what I
think is experienced in all organizations where military and civilians work
together.

4
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First off, major objectives get the job done. And I think in all cases we do that.
Top level management sees to it that the military-civilian teamwork is maximized.
They’re doing real, real well right now; I know. I was just privy to a briefing
given by the present commander at the National Air and Space Intelligence Center
and I was very impressed with the civilian-military balance and how they’re
working.
00:52:22

DeHart: Also in the work environment, the Air Force leaders are central for
communicating goals and for supporting programs at Wright-Patterson Air Force
Base. Whom do you recall as being particularly effective in leadership?

00:52:43

Bilek: A person?

00:52:44

DeHart: Right—leaders of the air technical intelligence organizations.

00:52:49

Bilek: Well, tech intelligence started, or they trace it back to 1917. But modern
technical intelligence, more or less, a real big keystone would be the end of World
War II. Colonel [Donald] Putt, who went over to Germany to exploit the German
equipment, took a team over and then came back and became chief of tech
intelligence. He is probably, rightfully, the father of modern tech intelligence.
And one of the very outstanding performers was Colonel Hal Watson, who had
the wizard team—exploited the Me-262s and other German jet fighters and
technology. He became commander. Then Col. Watson—he became brigadier
general and then a major general in his second assignment. Outstanding people.
When Col. Putt left us as a colonel, he went on to become head of ARDC [Air
Research and Development Command] and I believe he retired as a general. A
commander of Foreign Technology Division after I left retired as a major general.
We had really some top-notch people, very great.

00:54:54

DeHart: Were they educated in engineering? Did they come from engineering
backgrounds?

00:54:59

Bilek: I’d say most all of them had either engineering, strong engineering
academic backgrounds or were exposed to enough engineering before they came
to us that they did a bang-up job during my tenure. And I, you know—after ’73
the commanders, by and large, were Air Force Academy graduates to start out
with and had gone on for advanced engineering and management degrees. Of
course, they’d gone to command staff school—very strong academic
backgrounds.

00:55:56

DeHart: Ok, we will take a short break now.
[Break]

00:56:00

DeHart: This is Rachel DeHart interviewing Victor Bilek, who had a very
successful career in air technical intelligence. Mr. Bilek, did the Air Force use

Private contractors to acquire or translate technical and scientific information?
And were contractors used to test foreign equipment?
00:56:21

Bilek: Yes. [Laughing] We used contractors extensively. I guess there were
several categories, but notably we used people in the universities, professors who
were specialists in various areas. We had them under contracts where we could
use them on an as-needed basis and reimburse them accordingly, rather than on a
full retainer for constant commitment. And then we gave jobs to contractors for a
specific analysis or processing, much like we would do in the domestic area of
engineering. And the contractors included top level organizations in the United
States. Oh, I guess a top contract ran in those days a couple million dollars for a
year’s work. And we probably had at least 50 contract underway at times.
We had top engineers and information processing people committed under these
contracts to help us. And then we—the arrangement of having the contractors inhouse by actually providing them workspace in our establishment grew. And it’s
my understanding today, [that it] makes up [an] even more significant part of the
total population than it did in my day. But we had, oh maybe ten or so onboard
contractors. They were very valuable just in every respect; like higher civil
service people, except that it was under a contract arrangement, whereby we
didn’t have civilian personnel grade problems and retention problems and so
forth, subject to reductions in force. Contract gave us a lot of advantage.

01:00:06

DeHart: How did security clearances work with contactors? Were they given the
information they needed to do their work?

1:00:13

Bilek: Oh yeah. Yeah they were sworn to the same security levels as we. In fact,
where special facilities were necessary, they were sometimes built into the
contractor’s own home base facility, so that they were able to work on the
material in their factories or establishments as well as at our place.

1:00:43

DeHart: Ok. During the Cold War, Air Force intelligence went through several
reorganizations to better meet the challenges posed by international technological
developments. How did changes in organization and command structures affect
intelligence work at Wright-Patterson?

01:01:05

Bilek: Well, I’d like to say it didn’t affect the work I did an awful lot, but it did.
We started out, as I mentioned, at the end of World War II as the Intelligence
Department of the Air Materiel Command, equivalent to the Air Materiel
Command today. We were then transferred to become an arm detachment of the
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, headquartered in the United States Air
Force. And then the next transition was to the newly formed Systems Command.
We were made a division of that command and operated for many years as
Foreign Technology Division (FTD), known far and wide.

It was such when I left, and of course my knowledge of what has happened
afterwards is only in general. I know that they were transferred to the Operating
Commands under a new Air Force agency. Well the briefing I just got a few
weeks ago was—they said [they were] delighted to announce that the organization
is back as an arm now of the Assistant Chief of Staff of Intelligence of the Air
Force. So the old story: the wheel goes ‘round.
There definitely is a strong impact when such things as moving into the Systems
Command placed a great deal of our involvement with the Systems Command
divisions. Each division had its own intelligence department. For instance, the
one in, say, ballistic missiles worked—their intelligence group then worked with
our ballistic missile intelligence group, and there was mutual assistance. And
sometimes, admittedly, some problems arose in these arrangements, but by and
large they were very profitable. The clear emphasis then was our primary mission
of supporting research and development. Well now the importance—I believe the
importance is shifted more to supporting the Operational Commands because we
are involved, have been, in wars and we try and do a big job in supporting the war
fighters in every respect. And so we were at, most recently—I wish I could tell
you the exact organization—a part of a major operational command. I should
know that but I don’t off hand. [Laughing]
00:04:25

DeHart: That’s fine. So when there were reorganizations, did it impact the
projects that you were working on or the priorities for those projects?

01:04:38

Bilek: Well when we went into the Systems Command, the support to the
laboratories got greater emphasis. And also out of that, I think a better working
relationship between our people and the laboratories and the Systems Command.
It was a two-way street; it was profitable both ways.

01:05:21

DeHart: As government agencies during the Cold War, the priorities of Air Force
intelligence organizations might be expected to reflect the priorities of each
successive presidential administration. Did it make a difference which person
was president?

01:07:00

Bilek: Well, [laughs] those presidents that had a big impact on U.S. involvement
for instance in Vietnam—I believe some three presidents at least were involved
with Vietnam. We were again during a period of active war. We played a very
active part in supporting the Operational Commands in Vietnam. We sent teams
into Vietnam and briefed them on the capabilities of Soviet surface-to-air missiles
that were intercepting our bombers and our reconnaissance. Improving our
survivability in this new threat area of—we had some pretty high losses to these
SAMs (Surface-to-Air Missiles). We gave the 105 operators at the time—we
gave them some valuable information on survival with the SAMS to attack and
also on what their radar were capable of detecting and tracking and picking up our
intrusions into their air space.

01:07:00

DeHart: Can you go into a little bit more detail about how you—the process that
you had to go through to get into Vietnam with working with the personnel
ceilings?

01:07:09

Bilek: Well when they wanted us over there for information, obviously there
would be no problem with entry. We got an invitation to come in and brief them.
Then in an effort, which I personally got involved—it was really not an FTD
project—but I was Assistant to the Commander of Foreign Technology Division,
Assistant for Limited War and I got involved in the limited war meetings in
Washington on programs that were underway. When one came up on battle
damage assessment of the U.S. Tri-Service Air, Ground and Sea Equipment, I was
made chairman of a joint-services group and then had to get authority to put a
team into the theatre to do the job. Well that ran into a lot of problems that we
had to get authorization, and for every position that was given to us for our team
meant one less position in the combat theatre because it was an overall ceiling. It
was a hard number and if you took one position, gave it to a program, that meant
one less combat got in, and the emphasis—of course combat commanders wanted
every combat position they could have. So it depended on the circumstances of
getting into Vietnam. Our briefing team did an extraordinarily good job over
there; were very well received by the Air Force units in Vietnam and in Thailand.
And the Navy heard the briefing and was so impressed by it, they had the team go
out onto the carriers and brief Navy pilots on their carriers. You can see our
effort was well appreciated.

01:09:59

DeHart: The Vietnam War created unanticipated demands on the Air Force.
How was intelligence affected by the Vietnam War? Were there new
technologies required?

01:10:13

Bilek: Well as I mentioned we went over and briefed them over there, which was
an extraordinary effort. We did not com—[laughs]—I don’t think there was any
precedent of a team of that sort to an operational command. We briefed the—like
the commander of SAC [Strategic Air Command]—went in office in Omaha and
briefed him. But that was a great deal different than putting a team together and
putting them into a combat theatre. They were at risk actually. They moved
around in the areas that were threatened by VC [Viet Cong]. So I just think that
was a different deal than briefing operational commanders at their headquarters,
so there wasn’t—that kind of difference existed.

01:11:25

DeHart: During the Vietnam Was there a shift from—as after World War II you
shifted from an interest in German technology to Soviet technology—was there a
shift away from Soviet technology?

01:11:39

Bilek: There was a big step because of the involvement of a whole, certainly one
if not two generations of technology, as the surface-to-air-missiles that were
operational in North Vietnam were a quantum jump above anything that was
operational in World War II. Complex command and control systems; detection

countermeasures; our aircraft, of course, were much higher performance—
[laughs]—cost a whole lot more money. Aircraft lost in Vietnam were in the
millions of dollars and the investment of the people was far greater than World
War II, in terms of the amount of training and technology involved. It’s a hard
thing to answer.
01:12:49

DeHart: We’ve talked about a good span now of your career. How would you
describe the changes in your responsibilities from starting out as a technical
analyst to moving into more management positions?

01:13:05

Bilek: Well I really don’t know exactly how that came about. That’s where
personal choices occur. I was Chief of the Armament Branch and an analyst.
And one day I was told that I was going to go up on the staff and a job called
Production Control—a very small staff group that would meet some alleged
shortcomings in our staff management. And the officer who I believe at that time
was chief of the aircraft analysis group and I opened that office with stenographic
assistance; but we had no further assistance. We started analyzing customer
needs and our own responsiveness, priorities, scheduling, shifting of manpower to
meet higher priorities and that sort of thing for the General. And that was Major
General Duer. He put a lot of credibility in our work and more or less approved
most of our recommendations, if not all. We were a very strong force in
management at that time.
And then I think it was in 1961 when DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency] was
formed. DIA was very much concerned about the mission of the Foreign
Technology Division. It was the biggest of the service tech intelligence divisions,
so they really investigated our management with a fine-toothed comb. They
demanded a program that, unlike anything we’d ever done before—every bit of
our effort, all our manpower, all our contract expenditures and everything had to
be identified and put in the total context, and evaluated for performance and
priorities, and shifting of resources and so forth. And whether we like it or not,
they wanted to take a major role in it. We were under Systems Command. They
had a Department of Intelligence, and they had a person that worked with the
DIA. And the headquarters USAF Intelligence had a person that worked with
DIA; and we had to put it all together and had more management than we could
handle almost in the way of coordinating and satisfying all these people who were
looking at us with a magnifying glass, really, right down to the individual
working level. It was a big problem and not too much appreciated by a lot of
people. The difficulty that was.
But we did put together a program document of that sort every year and had to get
it up to DIA. Big things came out of it, such as more money for machine
language translation. We got—talking about millions of dollars—big computers
in those days—I remember we acquired an IBM 365. I believe it was one of the
biggest in the country at that time, and it cost us, I think in our budget in our
program, six million dollars. Today’s people tell me they have more capability on

their desk than we had in that huge equipment taking up a big room with an
elevated floor and its own air conditioning system, many big tape drives and what
not. They kid me about that now. You can have more in a handheld device than
we had then. [laughs]
01:18:09

DeHart: This work that you were doing studying the infrastructure of the
intelligence community within the Air Force, was that during your time as
Assistant to the Chief Scientist?

01:18:23

Bilek: [laughs] No, the chief scientist job was an exit job. When I came back
from Vietnam on battle damage, I got back into my old job from the DIA
program, but the organization was being realigned with plans and programs with a
lot of pressure on having organizations consistent with the Systems Command.
So I really didn’t fit into it anymore in the way I had been used to. So I was given
the concession—option of taking it as they were wanting me to do it or taking
retirement and I chose to take retirement. And so I was given a temporary
assignment in the chief scientist’s office. In the—I think I was there a couple
months. . I undertook to put together a study of the whole technical intelligence
structure in the United States government—air technical intelligence. And I went
out and identified not only what was in the CIA and DIA [Defense Intelligence
Agency], but organizations that nobody ever talked about in those days that had to
do with special collections areas. This was a top secret report with additional
classifications on it, and I prepared it for the commander. He was delighted with
having such a total appreciation of who all was in the business and what authority
do they have and what resources and how did we fit within that total structure.
And that was my swan song.

01:20:38

DeHart: Well that’s a great achievement. What was that report used for?

01:20:44

Bilek: For the commander’s personal use and for his deputy’s. That’s what he
told me he was going to do with it. He may have just trashed it, I don’t know.
[Laughs] In fact, some of it was pretty borderline, kind of in the super-secret
“black” area that very few people were talking about, and so that might have put it
in jeopardy, and he might have decided best get rid of it. It would have been a
good choice.

01:21:13

DeHart: You also produced the first air technical intelligence handbook.5 Is that
correct?

01:21:20

Bilek: Back in 1940—well say 1950—we could definitely get a date on this by
General Vandenberg was Chief of Staff—we put together what was called an air
technical intelligence threat estimate of the Soviet capability, and the team was
made up of air, aircraft, missiles, armament.6 We went up to the Pentagon;
briefed several levels. Everybody was very enthusiastic about it; said “brief

5
6

“The Foreign Aircraft Armament Handbook.”
General Hoyt Vandenberg was Chief of Staff between 1948 and 1953.

General Vandenberg.” So we went in and briefed him. He was impressed by it.
He said “I have a meeting of the top aircraft manufacturers [in the] United States
in New York City, having a room set aside in one of the top hotels—classified.”
And he said “will you guys come up and put this on?” So we were delighted at
the idea. So they set up an airplane to fly us up to New York. We had all our
visuals on, I think they were roughly 30 x 40 pressboard and all of them were art
drawings showing tables and graphs and so forth, and we had them in a nylon
bag/suitcase type of think to carry on the airplane. We put it in the—this was in
the AT-11bom training version; had bomb bay and bomb bay doors in it. We put
it in there in the bomb bay over the doors, and on the trip to New York the
vibration shook the doors open and we salvoed the whole briefing in the
Chesapeake.
Well that created quite a stir because it was top secret and it was dumped out into
the community; you know anybody could have found it. So of course we got the
state police involved—New Jersey, Washington, D. C., and I don’t know who al
was involved, and of course the Air Force special intelligence—special
investigations people. And after a big investigation they said it went into the deep
water and there’s no risk of disclosure. I don’t know how they came to that
conclusion, but that’s what they did. And we—that night in the hotel, the team
went to work on the floor and made all new visual aids and put on the briefing for
a collection of the top level presidents, vice presidents, chief engineers, aircraft
industry; [it] went over big.
01:24:37

DeHart: That is a great story.

01:24:39

Bilek: Yeah. [laughing]

01:24:40

DeHart: Well, we will take another short break now.
[break]

01:24:45

DeHart: This is Rachel DeHart interviewing Vic Bilek, who served in air
technical intelligence during the Cold War. Mr. Bilek, can you describe your
experience traveling in the Russian Corridor?

01:24:58

Bilek: Well I went to Europe a few times to visit our detachments and also visited
aircraft armament production facilities in Sweden, France, Germany, Great
Britain. As part of that, on one occasion, one of our officers who I happened to
know personally, a friend, he said he was going to drive to Vienna and cover the
change of guard from the American to the Soviet, and then of course, it was, I
believe British and French had cessions. So I said “sure, I’d like to go along.” So
we went in an unmarked black sedan with German plates on it and no identity
associated with the military. And he was in civilian clothes. We started down the
Russian Corridor. I should say it was an open thoroughfare through the Russian
Corridor used by the joint forces. We’re driving down this all alone, not another

car we’re seeing. And my friend, spotted a microwave antenna that he had not
seen before and commented on it. He said “would you mind if we stopped and
took pictures of it?” I said “no, that’s ok with me.” So he stopped the car and he
says “I’m going to lift the hood and the trunk and you take pictures from the
inside of the car with a camera with a big telephoto lens.” He said “you know
how to operate that camera?” I said “yeah I’m familiar with it.” So he went to
work playing like he was working on the engine, and I was taking pictures at
various f-stops.
And a Russian personnel carrier came over a hill just ahead of us and slammed to
a stop no more that 50 to 100 yards from our car. All of the Russian troops in the
carrier jumped out on both sides of the road. My friend was absolutely frozen on
the—his hand on the hood. And I’m frozen on the camera, knowing full well that
I should open the cassette and expose it. But I just—I forgot everything. Then
we realized the troops all just simply peed alongside the highway. One guy ranb
down the road, back, and retrieved his hat that had been blown off. They all
jumped back in the truck and took off past us, just like we were not there. And
my friend was still attached onto the hood, and I’m still frozen on the camera.
Then it all came unglued and I say to this day that’s when I got my white hair.
Because had they stopped and found all the stuff I had in my briefcase, I would
have gone straight to Lubianka Prison for espionage.
1:28:00

DeHart: So they must have just assumed you were tourists or had car trouble.

1:28:03

Bilek: I couldn’t care less. They were just troops going to whatever they were
going.

1:28:12

DeHart: During your work at Wright-Patterson, you were also exposed to the
UFO program that was developed there.

1:28:17

Bilek: Well, that was coincidental too. I was a very close friend of the deputy for
analysis. He had actually, as a colonel, been Chief of Analysis at one time. His
name was Miles Gould—a real, real fine gentleman. I think it was right after the
Roswell incident in 1947—July 1947. We got a letter down from, I believe it
was from General Twining, who was head of the Material Command at that time,
assigning us the job of analyzing the information on the Unidentified Flying
Objects. And it was done under super-secret arrangement, wherein they built a
special room—no windows and a locked door—right off of the analysis division
work area. And Miles Gould had the responsibility of setting up the first of the
information on the flying objects reporting, including hardware.
Well, being such good personal friends—and he knew I had clearances and so
forth and was discreet—he asked me, “would I like to see the inside of the room?”
I said, “sure,” not knowing at all what was going to be in there. We went in the
room—this is after hours, after everybody else had gone—we looked over the
pictures that they had acquired of objects and different kind of photographic

situations. And he had a little bit of hardware in there. As I remember it, one
hardware piece was of particularly note, where somebody claimed that this
Unidentified Flying Object had landed in their back yard. And they retrieved this
little piece of it, turned it into the Air Force, and it was clearly evident that some
of the components in that piece were like RCA vacuum tubes. That was a first
indication of what was going to be hundreds and ten thousands of reports that
came in of the sightings of flying—Unidentified Flying Objects.
Ed Ruppelt became the first case officer. He was taken out of the Aircraft
Analysis Group and given the full responsibility. Then a Captain Hardin got it.
And then Captain George Gregory got the Blue Book Project. George was a very
close, dear friend. In fact, my wife Marge and I were pretty much instrumental in
getting him and his girlfriend together. They got married and had a family, and
we’ve been friend ever since. George actually put together a big thick album of
his memoirs of being head of the Blue Book Project and he officially deeded this
to me and I still have this to this day, with thoughts that I better decide who I’m
going to give it to, because it certainly should be kept in some archive—either the
Air Force Museum or the Wright State Archive, the only two I can think of—very
interesting compendium of information.
01:32:30

DeHart: Why do you think the UFO project was a priority for Wright-Patt?

01:32:36

Bilek: Well, it was a priority in Washington, because not only did the top people
in CIA, and defense, and military forces, the scientific community—everybody
was worried about this really being a forerunner of either an invasion from space,
or that the Soviets had made a really, a technological breakthrough and had a
flying saucer, which had a capability of free access to the United States for
reconnaissance. And should they have any cause for something more drastic, it
would be a terrible threat if war would occur between the United States and the
Soviet Union; “cold” war would come to an end.
Well, this emphasis spread out into the scientific community, particularly, also
into the media, and it raised big national headlines featured on radio and early TV.
People that had been associated with the program, like Professor Hynek, who had
been our technical consultant throughout the Blue Book program—then when he
was released, he started to expound on what he thought about it, openly, for
public consumption. People who’d been contractors with the military, like Phil
Class, they started—a fellow named Friedman. Well, it goes on. Marine Keyhoe,
Major Keyhoe—these people stirred up the whole country on the threat of saucers
from space or from the Soviets. So, of course, a high priority was put on what is
there really going on? And we all know it has not stopped. Right now the
History Channel and Discovery are constantly coming on with very recent
incidents that are occurring around the world of even greater note than what we
had in our day. It’s just too strong evidence to totally discount, I think. I think
most people that have really studied this across the board over the many years

have concluded there must be something behind it, behind, rather than just an
illusion.
01:35:48

DeHart: Well, your career took place—the majority of your career took place
during the Cold War, which was a period of intense technological competition
between the United States and the USSR. What would you describe as your
mindset and that of your colleagues, working over the 1950s and 1960s? What
was your awareness of the Cold War, and—

01:36:16

Bilek: Well, the greatest—problem: People, and the leaders of our respective
countries—all of them, not just the Soviet—what is now Russia, but German
leadership and British and French—gets over into the Orient. All leaders vying
for certain interests and power. Something in innate human nature—we can’t
leave well enough alone. We’re looking—we constantly look for threats to our
very existence. I must say that the same sort of thing that we were—started out
with our concern to the Soviet[s] seems to be emerging now: our concern to the
Chinese and their advances in military and space technology. They are becoming
as big a potential threat as did the Soviets appear to us back in the fifties and
sixties.
Then when the Soviet Union—Communism—failed, and for a moment there
seemed like there was going to be peace and harmony in the world, the new
Russia leadership and ours found small things to quarrel about in the beginning.
And now they seem to have been enlarged to bigger issues. I think the problem’s
going to start right over again. We’re going to have another period of intense cold
war of a different nature. Now those are my own personal conclusions after my
exposure over the years. And I know I’m not current with current intelligence; I
have no inside information, certainly no classified information, but that’s my
personal feeling.

01:38:46

DeHart: Why do you think that T-2 Intelligence, the Air Technical Intelligence
Center and later the Foreign Technology Division were located at WrightPatterson Air Force Base as opposed to elsewhere? ]

01:39:01

Bilek: Well, as I mentioned, Colonel Putt was—I believe he was in the
engineering division at the time he was elected to put the team together and go
over to Germany and look at the German materials and bring it back to Wright
Field. And actually it turned out a good deal of the hardware was brought to
Freeman Field over in Indiana about 50 miles away. And it became a big center
for it. Then the rest of it came into Wright Field and we used the Wright Field
laboratories for analysis and our primary customer was the research and
development community, contractors as well as military. So it was just natural
[…?...] that we remain located with the R & D focused at Wright Field. Then as
the systems command grew and the divisions grew and it became a widespread,
nationwide—again looking for a focal point there was no better place than Wright
Field, rather than taking it into Washington, for instance.

And then at one point there was a great move to move the whole thing to Florida.
They had a piece of –Cape Kennedy, an air base down there that was being
phased down and we could have had the facilities and so forth. And we—it came
pretty close to moving the whole thing to Florida, but then, as usual, a
congressman got into it. Of course, and Ohio congressman took a strong stand
that the Foreign Technology Division should stay where it is, as an asset to the
Wright Field community and so forth. And the decision was more or less
canceled and we remained where we are.
And the organization has grown immensely since then. The briefing I heard
recently, the plant facility is well over a billion dollars now. A real national asset,
and too much facilities, special facilities and hard work focused here at Wright
Field, and I think it will stay at Wright Field and it should so.
01:41:40

DeHart: Did you feel, working at Wright Field, that the intelligence organization
there received widespread support throughout the Air Force?

01:41:51

Bilek: Well, yes. When that “systems command” concept of all the divisions
producing a little of their own intelligence but supporting the Foreign Technology
Division—that had a lot of merit to it. We did gain access to a lot of top level
engineering talent in electronics, missiles, space. Arnold Center down there with
the wind tunnels,--just everywhere, Griffiths Air Force Base electronics, became
invaluable in providing us specialized equipment to do our job, giving us a high
level technical consultation; and that set the stage for where they are today.

01:42:50

DeHart: What do you think are the major contributions of Wright-Patterson Air
Force Base and the intelligence organizations there during the Cold War.

01:43:03

Bilek: Well I’d like to think we were a strong influence on the multi-billion
dollar research and development program, and that on the other side of the coin,
the direct support to the combat in Vietnam, in Korea, and then our open literature
support to national, academic, and research and development. Machine language
translation program has evolved now; I think they they’re translating, you know,
maybe 20 different languages by machine translation. I sat in one time recently
where they gave us a demonstration. They said “give us a subject that you’d like
to know about” and we told them something about Russian progress in rocket
fuels. Well they went—they got a document in Russian language, sent it to
Germany. No I mean—I got this backwards, I’m sorry. They got the document
out of Russia, put it in the machine language translation; translated the document
and gave it to us while we were sitting. Made the whole cycle in some—less than
an hour that we had the translation of the document. And now they can do this in,
well maybe 20 languages. Terrific!

01:44:50

DeHart: That’s impressive

01:44:51

Bilek: And I don’t think there’s another specialty in the United States that could
equal that. And our ability in photo and electronic interpretation is unparalleled;
it’s just top notch.

01:45:11

DeHart: Well is there anything else that you would like to add that we haven’t
addressed yet?

01:45:16

Bilek: Well I’d like to conclude on a note—I take great honor in having been
elected to the National Air and Space Intelligence Center’s Hall of Fame, and I
thank those of course that elected me to that position. I guess I’m the oldest oldtimer recognized there, especially the oldest living one. And I’d like to say I
thank my wife for contributions she made over all these years. Thank you.

01:45:53

DeHart: Thank you very much. This concludes our interview.

